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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the twentieth century, employment contracts have evolved
to compensate for the shortcomings of common law. At common law, employers
have no ownership right to their employees' post-termination inventions.
However, employment contracts can supersede the common law, and most
employers have taken advantage of this mechanism to secure their commercial
interests.
Through experience, employers have become savvy enough to insist that all
employees assign their inventions made during employment andinventions made
post-termination, when reasonable. Yet, with the emergence of such
comprehensive covenants, the courts have grappled with the question of how to
gauge their enforceability. Should an assignment of future inventions be treated
like any other restrictive covenant? Although the methodology for assessing the
enforceability of non-competition agreements is well established, is this
methodology easily transferable to inventive subject matter which, admittedly, is
characterized by different attributes? All of these questions will be addressed in
this commentary.
In the case law, the prevailing trend has been to apply non-competition
principles to invention-assignment trailer clauses. As argued here, this approach
is misguided because the variables on which non-competition analysis depends
were not designed to protect the interests associated with inventive subject
matter. For this reason, a new test is proposed which is adapted to the interests
at stake in invention assignment clauses, both to employers and employees.
Along with this proposal, it will be argued that nondisclosure-confidentiality
clauses are more closely related to invention covenants than non-competition
clauses. Accordingly, the analytical framework for future inventions covenants
(trailer clauses) should have been more closely aligned with confidential
information agreements than the non-competition analysis currently used.
Before engaging in a debate on these issues, a review of the legal framework
for future invention assignments is required. As a preliminary measure, we will
therefore present an overview of the law, including the common law rules, the law
of "future improvements" clauses, and finally the rules governing trailer clauses.
Thereafter, the law of trailer clause language, scope, and enforceability will remain
the analytical focus of this commentary.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEwoRK
What rules govern the ownership of inventions and corresponding patents if
a patent application has been made? In employment relationships, the answer to
this question would depend on three factors, namely: (1) whether a contract has
2006]
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been entered into between the inventor and employer, and, if so, (2) whether
trailer clause language was used, or (3) a "future improvements" clause instead.
The rules governing all three of these scenarios are addressed in the following.
In the absence of a contract between employer and employee, the common
law rules dictate ownership or assignment of ownership with respect to an
employee's invention. The common law rules also govern ownership if an
"intellectual property agreement" existed between employer and employee, but
its provisions have been declared void or unenforceable. Bearing this in mind, we
will briefly introduce the common law rules governing ownership in employment
relationships.
A. COMMON LAW RULES OF INVENTION OWNERSHIP
Absent a written agreement, employees who are hired for the purpose of
inventing, or who are assigned to a project which primarily involves inventing,
must surrender to their employers any ownership right in their inventions.1
Whether an employee was hired for the purpose of inventing can be determined
by inference, if not agreed to explicitly between the parties.2 If this test is
satisfied, the employer will acquire full title to the invention, including any patents
which have been issued on it.3 If ownership, or even a patent, has already been
granted in favor of the inventing employee, a court would order the employee to
assign all rights in the invention (or corresponding patent) to the employer as well.
However, the "hired to invent" rules do not apply if the employee was hired
to develop an invention that he had previously conceived on his own before hire.4
Nor can employers acquire ownership of inventions developed and reduced to
practice by the employee after his termination, since such inventions would fall
outside the employment relationship.'
In addition, the "hired to invent" rule does not apply if an employee was hired
to perform work which was "general" in nature. In the latter case, or if the
State v. Neal, 12 So. 2d 590, 591 (Fla. 1943).
2 Id. at 592. In City of Cocao v. Lefflr, 803 So. 2d 869, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), the court
considered the following factors from Nealto determine whether an employee was hired to invent:
(1) was the employee paid from funds which were earmarked for that particular invention?; (2) did
the employee devote the majority of his time to the work from which the invention arose?; (3) did
the employer pay all expenses associated with obtaining the patent, if one was issued?; (4) was the
employee given the specific task of developing a new method relating to the resulting invention?; (5)
did the employer attempt to first obtain a patent in the name of the employer?
3 Neal, 12 So. 2d at 591.
4 Cahill v. Regan, 157 N.E.2d 505 (N.Y. 1959).
5 Int'l Carrier-Call & Television Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 142 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 13:279
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
worker was hired not specifically for the purpose of inventing, the employee will
retain all ownership rights to their own invention.
6
Apart from these rules, there is one additional doctrine which protects
inventing employees who have not entered into agreements with their employers.
This doctrine secures title to employees who invent at home, without their
employer's equipment, compensation, or supplies.' Because of this disconnect
from their employer's own inventions, workplace, and activities, the employee is
rewarded ownership of his invention under the common law.'
There are also employees who were not hired to invent, but who nonetheless
used the employer's time, equipment, workplace, and resources to craft what
resulted in an invention. In the absence of an intellectual property agreement, this
category of worker will maintain full ownership of their invention, except that the
employer will own a "shop right" in it.9 A shop right is the non-exclusive and
non-transferable" license to use an employee's invention within the employer's
workplace or for the conduct of the employer's business." Owning a shop right
does not, however, earn the employer any royalties from the invention's
subsequent sales' 2
Even after the inventing employee departs, the employer maintains ownership
in the shop right.'3 Regardless of whether the inventing employee later proceeds
to patent the invention, the employer will nonetheless maintain a shop right to use
that invention permanently.' 4
Finally, employees can also be forced to assign their inventions to their
employers if they held positions of trust and were fiduciaries of the company."
This applies to employees who were in positions of upper management or who
had access to sensitive company information including trade secrets.
6 Id. at 508.
Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cit. 1996).
Id.
Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., 715 F.2d 962, 965 (5th Cit. 1983).
'0 However, the right is transferable if the employer sells its company. In this case, the shop
right will remain with the business after sale. Cal. E. Labs., Inc. v. Gould, 896 F.2d 400, 402 (9th
Cir. 1990).
n McElmurry v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
12 Id.
13 Thomson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 174 F.2d 773 (4th Cit. 1949).
14 Id.
" N. Branch Prods., Inc. v. Fisher, 131 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 135, 137 (D.D.C. 1961).
2006]
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B. CONTRACTUAL RULES OF EMPLOYER INVENTION OWNERSHIP
The common law rules set out in the foregoing can be overridden by an
express written or verbal agreement.'6 As a general rule, future patents (or
unpatented ownership rights in future inventions) are assignable from employee
to employer, provided the assignment is made in clear and unequivocal terms. 7
It also must be made at the time of hire and not once the employment is
underway; if an assignment of invention rights is made after the employment has
begun, new consideration will be needed in exchange for the continuation of
employment-at-will.
If an ownership interest in an invention is already embodied in a patent (or
patent application), assignment of this interest can only be made in writing.19
Otherwise, mere unpatented title to an invention can be assigned from employee
to employer, even if the invention does not yet exist.2°
Since future invention assignments are what concern us in this commentary,
we will concentrate on the legal principles of invention ownership following an
employee's departure from the workplace. As addressed in the foregoing, without
an intellectual property agreement, employers can only hope to own their
employees' inventions if the employee was "hired to invent." Absent this
requirement, employers who have no employment contract with their workers will
see their employees' inventions leave when the employment relationship is
terminated. If an employer has not taken the precaution to secure an invention
ownership clause, the employer cannot profit from inventions made in their own
workplace, will have no title to them, and certainly cannot patent them.
Given these disadvantages in the common law rules, it is increasingly common
for employers to have their employees sign a future inventions clause upon hire.2'
Evidently, if an employee produces a highly lucrative invention, the employer has
16 Burr v. De La Vergne, 7 N.E. 366, 369 (N.Y. 1886).
17 Monsanto Chem. Works v. Jaeger, 31 F.2d 188 (W.D. Pa. 1929). Note, however, that if an
assignment for future inventions is made before the inventions actually exist, the assignee will only
hold equitable tide. Once the invention has been completed, the assignee then acquires full title and
even patent rights if an application has been filed. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, 939 F.2d 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
is Mirafi v. Murphy, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1350 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
19 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2004).
'o Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. 205, 226 (1874). However, if the invention does not exist, the
employee can only assign equitable title to the employer. This equitable tide will become a valid legal
tide to the invention once the invention exists. Id.
21 D. Peter Harvey, Structuring Employment Relationships to Insure Ownership and Control
of Intellectual Property, at 35 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. G4-3934, 1995).
[Vol. 13:279
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EMPLOYMENTAGREEMENTS
every incentive to secure an exclusive right to own and market it, even after the
employee has departed from the workplace.
Generally speaking, clauses for assigning future (post-employment) inventions
are drafted in two types. The first is the "future improvements" type, which
grants the employer tide to inventions made by the worker while employed, in
addition to any improvements on those inventions made after the employment
relationship has ended.
The second is the "trailer clause" type. A trailer clause is a provision in an
intellectual property agreement which is phrased much like a non-competition
clause. Typically, in a trailer clause for future inventions, the employee covenants
to assign all post-employment inventions to the employer if they relate to the
employer's field of work. Depending on the contractual language, a future
inventions trailer may only be effective for a specified number of months or years
following termination, and is typically drafted to be limited in territorial scope.'
Since the law governing these two types of future invention assignments
differs, let us address each one in turn, beginning with future improvements
clauses.
1. Ownership Rules for 'Future Improvements" Clauses. Future improvements
clauses are no longer as frequently used as they once were. The trailer clause
phrasing has generally superseded "improvements" provisions due to the superior
protection which trailers provide.
The typical improvements clause is drafted to reference the inventions which
the employee has been hired to invent, followed by phrasing such as "licensors
hereby license and grant to the licensee... the inventions... and all applications
or patents for improvement thereof."'  Another example could resemble the
following-
J.A. Mould and C.B. Duffey hereby assign, transfer ... all the
rights... [in] any and all inventions in which they or any of them
may have an interest, whether patented or unpatented, relating to
the subject-matter of any of said patents or improvements thereon,
including any invention or improvement that they or any of them
may make in the future relating thereto ... 24
Other phrasing is also used but, generally speaking, these clauses grant the
employer ownership of any foreseeable inventions and any "improvements" to
them made following termination.
2 Id. at 56.
23 Treu v. Garrett Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 284, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (emphasis added).
24 Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 1943) (emphasis added).
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Even where such clauses specifically referencefutureimprovements, the courts
have construed these clauses to cover only inventions (and their improvements)
which actually existed when the contract was entered into:
It is well settled that an agreement to assign a patent and
improvements thereon covers only improvements existing at the
time the agreement was entered into unless the language specifically
refers to future improvements. The law does not look favorably
upon covenants which place "a mortgage on a man's brain, to bind
all its future products" . . . . [T]o effect an assignment of future
improvements to a patent which the inventor may thereafter
produce "the language of the contract must be very plain and
evidence unmistakably that such an agreement was in the mind of
the inventor."'25
In the absence of more specific language, such clauses cannot cover inventions
not yet made or improvements not begun when the contract was drafted.
Additionally, they will not cover post-employment improvements to those
inventions unless the intention to do so was manifestly clear. The mere phrase
"and any future improvements thereon" is not sufficient to enforce this intention:
A contract assigning future improvements and future inventions
will be enforced only where the language evidencing such an
intention is clear and convincing.... We hold that the provisions
of the 1950 contract are not sufficiently clear and free from
ambiguity to meet the test announced and applied in the foregoing
decisions; and that the language of this contract is not so specific as
to embrace all future inventions that might be perfected by Messrs.
Hoern and Dilts relating to the broad class of all "non-indexing,
non-continuous" boring machines. To the contrary, in granting an
exclusive license to "said Rotary-Cam Actuated Boring Machines"
and future improvements thereon, the 1950 contract... concededly
does not embrace Patent No. 2,872,853.6
There is also the rule that these clauses and, in fact, any clause pertaining to
ownership of future inventions beyond termination, must be strictly construed.
The extent of ownership assigned to the employer cannot exceed that which is
s De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
26 New Britain Mach. Co. v. Yeo, 358 F.2d 397,405 (6th Cit. 1966) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
[Vol. 13:279
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
explicitly and unquestionably provided for in the clause. The clause must be
construed to encompass the least of any interpretable scope, when phrased "any
improvements thereon":
"[W]hen the parties executed the contract... they had in mind the
particular function accomplished by the Saunders patent, rather
than the broad field of the possible future development of any kind
of gas hammer. . . ." [A] construction of the contract requiring
appellee to turn over any invention he might make at any time in the
future which could in any way be used in connection with any kind
of gas hammer was not required, and that the invention... was not
in contemplation of the parties .... While the contract here
involved is not the ordinary employer-employee one, the same
general principles of construction must be applied. Such contracts,
when they provide for the assignment of patents beyond the term
of the employment, are to be strictly construed; they must be fair,
reasonable and just. The rule is further stated in 25 R.C.L. Specific
Performance Sec. 108, "Nor will equity compel compliance with an
agreement to assign future inventions made after the inventor,
having been discharged from the employment .... "'
Other cases have similarly insisted on construing the scope of future
inventions clauses narrowly, particularly those which are ambiguous, because they
apply only to "improvements. '28
In short, the experience of employers using "future improvements" language
in their workers' invention assignments has not been favorable. The term "all
future improvements thereon" and similar phrasing is not specific enough to
guarantee the employer ownership of future inventions, and certainly not
ownership of patents already issued to the employee.
For this reason, trailer clause invention assignments have become increasingly
prevalent in the workplace. These clauses, designed to secure assignment of an
employee's future inventions, are of particular concern in this commentary.
2. Ownership Rules for Trailer Clauses. The purpose of an inventions trailer
clause (also known as a holdover clause) in an employment agreement "is to
prevent an employee from appropriating to his own use or to the use of a
subsequent employer inventions relating to and stemming from work done for a
previous employer.... [In equity and good conscience the fruits of that work
27 Mould, 133 F.2d at 817-18 (emphasis added).
2 Yeo, 358 F.2d at 408.
2006]
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should belong to the former employer."2 9 However, these clauses are not always
enforceable, even though they are signed by most inventing employees upon hire.
As described in the foregoing, trailer clauses are a more specific means of
assigning post-employment inventions than their simplistic future improvements
counterparts. This is because trailer clauses require employees to assign their
rights to inventions during employment and after termination for a specific
duration, within a designated territorial radius, and are limited to specific types of
inventions or subject matter. The parameters of these clauses are therefore
designed to avoid the ambiguity which improvements clauses may have been
prone to.
The phraseology of trailer clauses in invention assignments resembles the
restrictive covenants used in non-competition agreements. It is perhaps for this
reason that the courts have created rules to interpret their construction based on
the non-competition "reasonableness" standard. As one court observed,
New Jersey courts previously have not specifically addressed the
enforceability of a 'holdover' clause. We have, however, addressed
the enforceability of analogous employee noncompetition contracts.
We find that our determination on the enforceability of those post-
contracts is applicable to our determination in this case of the
enforceability of 'holdover' clauses.
30
Virtually every other court has followed this logic. Because, historically, there
have been relatively few trailer (holdover) judgments pertaining to employee
inventions, in the absence of an existing rule, the courts have chosen to follow the
non-competition model.3'
Within this legal framework, a court must determine whether a clause is
enforceable as a measure of its reasonableness with respect to three constraints:
(1) time, (2) subject matter, and (3) territorial scope. This is because "covenants
which restrict employment are against public poicy."32 To determine the degree
of reasonableness in restrictive invention covenants, a court must therefore apply
the following test: "A holdover provision will not be enforced unless it 'protects
the legitimate interests of the employer, imposes no undue hardship on the
employee and is not injurious to the public.' 31
2 Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 447, 452 (Ct. C1. 1970).
o Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 888 (N.J. 1988).
31 See id.
32 Fed. Screw Works v. Interface Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1562, 1564 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
31 Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (D.N.J. 1991).
[Vol. 13:279
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The courts that rely on this test have borrowed it directly from the non-
competition case law. It has been restated in several ways for the purpose of
inventions clauses, with minor variation. Yet, the three factors remain largely the
same from court to court:
With respect to the question of whether the provision of defendant
Calhoon's contract requiring him to disclose and assign all ideas and
improvements for a period of five years after termination of his
employment is void against public policy, three principles of law
must be considered: 1) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that
it is no greater than necessary to protect the employer in some
legitimate interest? 2) Is the restraint reasonable in the sense that
it is not unduly harsh and oppressive on the employee? 3) Is the
restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not injurious to the
public?'
In a few decisions, this formula for reasonableness has been described as a
balancing test between the interests of the employer and the employee, based on
which party has the most at stake.3"
For purposes of invention trailer clauses, what is "reasonable" between
employer and employee? The case law unanimously articulates that a covenant
is unreasonable and void if it is without any limitation in one of the three
parameters of time, territory, and subject matter.36 In terms of the temporal
restraints on invention assignments, this is no less true. In this regard, one court
has commented:
The agreements in question are for an indefinite period of time.
One employee worked for Interface for one year and the other for
only a few months. It is now ten years later and Interface seeks to
enforce termination agreements against these former employees
which would require them to turn over all inventions for an
indefinite period of time covering subjects both within the
Company's field of activity or "contemplated field of activity." It
is hard to imagine a more restrictive or overbroad agreement. It
34 GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 773 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
3s Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell, 340 F. Supp. 273,275 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Universal Winding
Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329, 331 (D. Conn. 1952).
3 Guth v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385, 388-89 (7th Cir. 1934); Fed. Scraw, 569 F.
Supp. at 1564; Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. at 773; United Shoe Mach. Co. v. La Chappelle, 99 N.E. 289,
293 (Mass. 1912); Ciavatta, 542 A.2d at 888.
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would be reasonable to restrict these ex-employees from using
information gathered at Interface. It is not reasonable to confiscate
all new inventions made by the employees for which Interface
might have an interest.
Because the employee termination agreements are invalid, they
cannot be the basis for imposing a constructive trust as alleged in
Count II. It is well settled that invalid agreements are
unenforceable.37
Thus, the reasonableness of any of the three constraints must be determined
according to whether the employer, in its inventions covenant, attempted to
protect more than its legitimate interests. "Generally, a clause is unreasonable if
it: (1) extends beyond any apparent protection that the employer reasonably
requires [or] (2) prevents the inventor from seeking other employment.... "38 In
another decision, an invention trailer assignment was held unreasonable and void
because it forced the employee to assign all inventions of any trpe for ten years
following termination." The ten year ban was deemed to be an unreasonable
restraint on trade:
The provision of the contract here sought to be enforced that for
10 years after its termination every invention shall be assigned to the
plaintiff savors of restraint of trade. It projects itself so far beyond
the period of actual employment and payment of wages that it
appears plainly to be in aid of the unlawful combination. It would
choke the inventive capacity of the defendant for a period so long
after his employment ceased that his usefulness to himself or to any
competitor would be extinguished in most instances.'
As regards subject matter reasonableness and enforceability in invention
covenants, the courts have addressed a range of possibilities. Evidently, a subject
matter restriction which is finely-tuned to one specific invention will not be
unreasonable. On the other hand, if the subject matter is limited to an entire
industry or field of inventions, it may be an unreasonable restraint of trade. A
covenant which forces an employee to assign his invention regardless of "subject
matter" will categorically be unreasonable:
37 Fed. Screw, 569 F. Supp. at 1564.
' Ciavatta, 542 A.2d at 888 (citation omitted).
39 La Cbapelk, 99 N.E. at 293.
40 Id.
[Vol. 13:279
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[The agreement] is not limited to the subject matter to which the
employee directed his attention when in the employ of appellee, but
extends to any business "in which said company during the period
of my employment by said company or by its predecessor or
successor in business is or may be concerned." In other words, if
appellee's predecessor were engaged in any other business to which
appellant's discovery might relate or its successor shall be
concerned, the contract applies.
Upon the facts peculiar to this case we are convinced that those
provisions of the contract which were limitless in extent of time and
in subject matter of invention were contrary to public policy ....
Under this contract he was, however, if he worked in another
laboratory or for another manufacturer, required to assign his
discoveries to appellee. This would effectively close the doors of
employment to him.... Such a contract conflicts with the public
policy of the land, which is one that encourages inventions and
discourages the exclusion of an employee from engaging in the
gainful occupation for which he is particularly fitted for all time,
anywhere in the United States.4
This decision, Guth v. Minnesota Mining, is typical in that it implies that a
covenant will be reasonable only if limited to the former employer's area of
expertise, but not if it could be interpreted broadly to encompass inventions in
several disciplines.42
As for the reasonableness of a covenant's territorial scope, this would depend
on the employer's region of business.43 It would also depend whether the
covenant forces the employee to leave town to find subsequent employment."
On the whole, if the agreement is too demanding on the employee in terms of
"' Guth, 72 F.2d at 388-89.
42 Id.
43 The territorial scope of covenants has not been the subject of any significant judicial scrutiny
in the above-cited cases on inventing employees. This may be due to employers omitting territorial
restrictions where a covenant secures the employer's interest by including subject matter and
temporal limits on invention ownership. Nonetheless, by analogy with the case law governing non-
competition covenants, the size of the employer's business region may contribute to a determination
of a covenant's reasonableness. See Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs.,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); McAlpin v. Coweta Fayette Surgical Assocs., P.C., 458
S.E.2d 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
" Savannah Bank, N.A. v. Say. Bank of the Fingerlakes, 691 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999); Stringer v. Herron, 424 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing the territorial implications
of analogous non-competition covenants).
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territorial scope, it would be deemed unreasonable and therefore void. As one
court has observed:
These cases hold that such contracts are not void if they are
unreasonably in restraint of trade. In determining their
reasonableness, an attempt should be made to weigh the competing
interest of employer and employee and to give full consideration to
the public interest. In terms of these interests, a covenant will be
void ab initio if it "extends beyond any apparently necessary
protection which the complainant might reasonably require, and
thus, without benefiting him, it oppresses the respondent, and
deprives people in other places of the chance which might be
offered them" to avail themselves of his services.4s
To reiterate, the foregoing factors of time, territory, and subject matter are the
deciding variables in the balancing-of-interests test which weighs: (1) the
employer's legitimate interests, (2) undue hardship to the employee, and (3) the
public interest.' Thus, given the territorial, temporal, and subject matter
constraints, if an inventions clause grants future assignment rights only to the
extent necessary and in a manner that does not unduly restrict the employee's
subsequent employment search, or offend the public interest, the covenant will
be deemed reasonable and enforceable.47
Finally, before invention rights can even be considered under this test, the
thing in dispute must amount to an invention.4" If it is an idea not yet put into
practice, the idea is not an invention within the meaning of most trailer clauses.49
However, if an invention was developed to the point of a drawing or blueprint,
it likely will come within the ambit of the trailer clause, even if it has not yet been
converted to tangible form and has not met the patentability requirements of
novelty and utility."0 Depending on the language of the contract, this rule will
bind the employee, even if he prepared the drawing in his own home."1
Despite all the foregoing rules, and regardless of how binding a restrictive
covenant may be, the law does not prevent inventors from using the general skills
4 Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329,332 (D. Conn. 1952) (citations omitted).
Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (D.N.J. 1991).
47 Id.
4 Nat'l Dev. Co. v. Gray, 55 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1944).
49 id.
5 Id
51 id.
[Vol. 13:279
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol13/iss2/1
EMPLOYMENTAGREEMENTS
and knowledge gained through their former employers.5 2 This experience is
always transferable from employer to employer without restriction.
III. THE TRAILER CLAUSE FOR FUTURE INVENTION ASSIGNMENTS:
A CRITIQUE
Having set out the invention ownership rules for employment agreements, the
next portion of this Article will critically review the courts' trailer clause standards.
Of particular interest, we will address whether an analytical framework designed
for non-competition agreements is appropriate when applied, as it is, to trailer
clauses for invention assignment and ownership. By analogizing these two types
of (seemingly) related covenants, did earlier courts misguide later courts by
grouping both covenants together leading current courts to examine trailer clauses
from a one-size-fits-all perspective? The following portion of this Article
addresses this issue and proposes a solution for reform.
A. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Among those who have criticized the courts in this field, most commentators
have advocated a more employee-friendly test for invention assignments within
trailer clauses. This rationale has been supported by a variety of reasons,
including encouraging the employee's inventive productivity rather than
restraining it:
The public policy issues involved in the enforceability of these
holdover clauses reflect the dichotomy of our views on the rights
of an inventor and rights of an employer. Our society has long
recognized the . . . importance of providing stimulation and
encouragement to inventors.... [T]he United States is in danger of
losing its position as technology leader of the world.... America
is experiencing a declining patent balance and is less patent-
productive than many foreign countries.5 3
This view has more poignantly been expressed from the position of the
subsequent employer. Some advocates have urged a less restrictive test for trailer
clauses because employers do not wish to hire someone inventively bound to their
former company:
2 Boost Co. v. Faunce, 86 A.2d 283, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
13 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 887 (N.J. 1988).
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While a trailer clause technically does not prohibit an inventive
employee from working for a competitor, business competitors do
not desire to hire individuals obligated under such a clause because
the work product of such employees may not accrue to the new
employer's benefit. At best, employers that hire inventive
employees obligated under such agreements will under-utilize the
employees' inventive skills so as not to develop conflicts with prior
trailer clauses. This under-utilization of a burdened inventive
employee's creative capacity may concomitantly diminish his rate of
compensation. At worst, the inventive employee is unemployed.
In today's society, where technology is advancing at breakneck
speed, under-utilization or non-utilization of inventive skill may
cause an inventive employee's creative capabilities and talent to
atrophy.5 4
Scholars have also urged that, because there is no common law right granting
employers post-termination ownership of their employees' inventions (unless the
employee is "hired to invent"), trailer clauses have no legal reason to exist and
should therefore be construed by the courts as void per se:
To the extent that trailer clauses are boilerplate and included in
general, non-inventive employees' contracts, the clauses should be
considered unenforceable per se. In these situations, these adhesive
clauses are imposed upon employees and protect no real employer
interest.... Unless an individual is in demand, for example, if one
is a Nobel Laureate, a trailer clause will be imposed adhesively upon
an inventive employee by large corporations.... Using trailer
clauses to protect mere expenditures, in essence, imposes a
restrictive covenant where one would otherwise not be allowed...
Employees have a right to compete with their former employers.
Competitors, as long as their conduct does not give rise to a
tortious interference claim, have a right to compete for the services
of employees.... The common law thoughtfully developed a series
of equitable rules that defined the rights employers had in
inventions developed by employees. Over the last several decades,
employers have taken to utilizing trailer clauses as a primary
protection device. Concomitant with the increased use of trailer
5 Marc B. Hershovitz, Note, Unhitching the Traikr Clause: The Rights of Inventive Emplqyees and their
Employers, 3J. INTELL. PROP. L. 187, 198-99 (1995).
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clauses by employers is an increased judicial acceptance of such
clauses.
The thoughtfully developed common law rules offer the
employer a great deal of protection while looking out for the
interests of the employee and society in general. Trailer clauses
abrogate the common law and eviscerate the protections for
employees which the common law established in the public interest.
Society's interest in encouraging invention and fostering
competition mandates a judicial declaration voiding trailer clauses
ab initio.55
The same author has also insisted that trailer clauses, by their very nature, run
contrary to the purpose which patents were designed to protect, stating that "[i]f
the purpose of patents is to encourage invention by granting an inventor a twenty
year monopoly, thereby enabling him to exploit the fruits of his creative
endeavors, does the enforcement of an employment contract's trailer clause
abrogate this purpose?" 6
In short, much of the commentary surrounding trailer clauses has encouraged
interpreting invention assignments in a light more favorable to employees. In this
Article, the opposite position will be taken, albeit indirectly. This Article will
argue that the current test (for invention trailers) is misguided because it is based
on factors such as temporal and territorial constraints. Although those criteria are
relevant to competition and the solicitation of an employer's clients, these factors
were not conceived to enforce employee invention clauses. In particular, the time
and territorial reasonableness factors are not adapted to the needs of employers
or employees within the inventions framework..
1. The Time Variable. Concededly, the "time" variable is relevant to the
enforceability of non-competition covenants because it shields the employer's
legitimate interests from employee competition and prevents solicitation of the
employer's client base. The reasonableness of the time variable is equally crucial
because an employee cannot be restrained from competing eternally.
Yet, while time is useful in non-competition analysis, it is a misplaced variable
when applied to inventions. Time is only relevant to inventions if a patent has
been assigned to an employer and will expire on a particular date. If no patent has
been issued on the employee's invention or the invention does not yet exist at
termination, time is not a relevant concern. This is because the assignment of an
existing or future invention is generally a thing of permanence. Employers would
s- Id at 206-10, 212.
s6 Id at 188.
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not bother to seek invention assignments if they could be declared void within a
reasonable time after termination.
Thus, because time has no place in the legal analysis of invention assignments,
it follows that an assignment of future inventions, even permanent, shouldbe deemed
reasonable according to our theory.
5 7
In sum, if an unlimited-duration inventions clause is always reasonable (due to
the nature of inventions), it is only logical that the time factor should be removed
from the trailer clause enforceability test entirely.
2. The Territorial Scope Variable. A similar argument can be made about the
territorial scope variable which the courts currently borrow from non-competition
law and import into invention assignments. Admittedly, it may be unreasonable
for an employer to enforce a non-competition covenant which prevents its
employee from competing within the employer's entire state."8 A worldwide
restraint on employee competition would almost certainly be void as
unreasonable." While the courts insist on applying this same geographic
reasonableness to trailer clauses (out of concern that "covenants which restrict
employment are against public policy,"60  and "clos[ing] the doors of
employment"61), these concerns are illegitimate for invention covenants.
There is a strong argument to be made that, in invention covenants, even a
worldwide restriction shouldbe deemed reasonable under the prevailing test. If an
employer-assigned invention is patentable, its eventual patent would be effective
across the United States. The patent may even be effective in other countries if
applications were made abroad. Thus, a patent itself operates like a nation-wide
(and sometimes world-wide) restriction on another's use of an invention. If an
employer has obtained a national patent for that invention, why should the
assignment clause be limited to the employer's metropolitan area? If a trailer
clause were drafted so narrowly in geographic scope, it would be useless to the
employer since there would be no possibility of ever obtaining a patent. An
employer cannot patent what it does not own beyond the city limits. This
57 By contrast, a permanent restraint in the non-competition or non-solicitation field would be
held categorically unreasonable, illustrating how greatly post-employment inventing differs from
post-employment competition.
Despite the differences between inventions and competition, courts have still not understood
that post-employment inventing should not be treated the same as post-employment competition.
As the test described in Part II.B.2 shows, the courts continue to apply the same non-competition
(time and space) factors to invention covenants, no matter how misplaced they are and how
awkwardly they may transfer to invention subject matter. The courts simply do not distinguish one
restrictive covenant from another, no matter how different they are.
5" Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Dewberry, 51 S.E.2d 669 (Ga. 1949).
'9 Telxon Corp. v. Hoffman, 720 F. Supp. 657, 664 (N.D. I11. 989).
6o Fed. Screw Works v. Interface Sys., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1562, 1564 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
6' Guth v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385, 388 (7th Cit. 1934).
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example further demonstrates how the courts have misapplied non-competition
criteria to the very different subject matter of inventions. The cases cited in Part
II.B.2 illustrate this questionable approach.
Because a nation-wide territorial restriction on reproducing an invention should,
hypothetically, be reasonable, it is only logical that the territorial scope variable
should not apply to inventions at all. This variable is well-adapted to any other
type of restrictive employment covenant, but is clearly not suited to future or
present invention assignments.
3. Justification for Broader Constraints. For the reasons stated, temporal and
territorial reasonableness are misused variables in the inventions context. Yet
even if they were appropriate, broader time and territorial constraints would be
justifiable because employers typically have more at stake in preventing the loss
of their inventions than in preventing employee competition. Many companies'
livelihoods depend upon their ability to sell and market one particular invention
which they own. Without that invention, the company could not survive.
By contrast, the potential losses to a company are less significant if an
employee competes with it, thus justifying narrower time and territory constraints.
This is because employees who choose to compete in the same field as their
employers generally obtain employment with e.dsting competitors of their
employers. In so doing, they pose a relatively insignificant risk of damaging the
former employer's business. It is much less frequent that a former employee
actually begins his own competing business and introduces a new direct
competitor into the former employer's market.
In short, even if the non-competition factors of temporal and territorial
reasonableness could rationally be applied to invention ownership, the scope of
either one could be drafted more broadly than in a non-competition clause and
still meet the reasonableness standard.
B. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
As the foregoing suggests, the courts' inability to distinguish analytically
between invention covenants and non-competition covenants is discouraging for
employers. Admittedly, both types of covenants have the surface appearance of
similar terms, including a time limitation, a subject matter limitation, and a
territorial limitation. They share the common feature of being restrictive
covenants in employment. Some courts have gone so far as to call invention
trailer clauses "covenant[s] not to compete,""2 which only reinforces the
6 Armorlite Lens Co. v. Campbell, 340 F. Supp. 273,274 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Universal Winding
Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329, 332 (D. Conn. 1952).
2006]
19
Caldwell: Employment Agreements for the Inventing Worker: A Proposal for Re
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2006
J. INTELL PROP. L
confusion. Yet, apart from these few elements, invention trailer clauses have little
in common with non-compete provisions.
Having emphasized this distinction, there is nonetheless one common element
which can be used in an enforceability test for both non-competition and future
invention covenants: the "subject matter reasonableness" criterion. Whether the
subject matter of the covenant is reasonable constitutes a valid area of inquiry for
both types of clauses. In fact, for inventions clauses, subject matter is arguably
the ony crucial and defining element of the reasonableness test. The balancing
test explained in Part II.B.2 could not be effectively performed in the absence of
subject matter considerations.
In a trailer clause, a future inventions assignment will not be enforceable if its
field of inventive subject matter is so broad that an employee would be prevented
from seeking future employment.63 This is a legitimate interest from which an
employee deserves protection, unlike time and territory which are irrelevant
restrictions to the inventions field. A properly drafted future inventions covenant
would be limited to the type of product the employee was expected to work on
when hired. It should be phrased as specifically and narrowly as possible to avoid
overbreadth and, consequently, a finding of voidness."
Under this standard, a trailer clause is almost certainly enforceable if limited
to the minute scope of the employer's operations and clientele, and drafted not
to encompass similar devices developed by competitors. Such a narrowly-tailored
restriction would permit the employee, upon departure, to have a range of
employment options available for his particular skills and knowledge. The
availability of post-employment options to the employee is, according to some
courts, the overriding concern in the enforcement of restrictive covenants.6"
To illustrate, the subject matter scope of the Guth trailer clause was not drawn
narrowly enough to suit this purpose. There the covenant was drafted to grant
the employer an undeserved number of future invention rights unrelated to the
covenantor's precise work for the employer. The clause covered any future
invention "relating to any subject matter with which my work for said company
is or may be concerned."" The clause was phrased to construe the company's
range of activity as broadly and vaguely as possible and, on this basis, was declared
unenforceable.67 The court insisted that "[u]nder this contract [the employee]
was, however, if he worked in another laboratory or for another manufacturer,
63 Gutb, 72 F.2d at 388.
64 d.
65 Fed. Screw, 569 F. Supp. at 1564.
66 Guth, 72 F.2d at 387.
67 Id. at 388.
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required to assign his discoveries to [his former employer]. This would effectively
close the doors of employment to him."'
Because subject matter is the only truly relevant factor of the three, the test
proposed for trailer clause enforceability is one primarily based on subject matter
reasonableness. In addition, the test advocated here would incorporate the
further element of a balancing test used by a limited number of courts in their
examination of invention trailers.6 9 The balancing element is crucial because,
although susceptible to arbitrariness, it permits a court to concretely weigh the
importance of the employer's interests and to gauge whether the employer would
objectively suffer a hardship greater than the employee's if its operations were
prejudiced by an invention. The balancing test would also account for the
employee's future employment limitations resulting from the invention and the
assignment clause.
At present, the balancing element serves as a final prong in the tests which
some, but not all, courts apply to trailer clause enforceability. This balancing test
has been described as follows: "In determining [the trailer clause's]
reasonableness, an attempt should be made to weigh the competing interests of
employer and employee and to give full consideration to the public interest.
70
According to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Ciavatta, the employer's
interests in this balancing test will generally weigh more heavily than the
employee's when a proprietary interest is at stake.7 ' By "proprietary interests," the
Ciavaita court was referring to "trade secrets or confidential information" and,
arguably, the confidential information constituting an invention as well:
Plainly, the court must balance these competing interests. In cases
where the employer's interests are strong, such as cases involving
trade secrets or confidential information, a court will enforce a
restrictive agreement. Conversely, in cases where the employer's
interests do not rise to the level of a proprietary interest deserving
of judicial protection, a court will conclude that a restrictive
agreement merely stifles competition and therefore is
unenforceable.72
68 id.
69 Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329,332 (D. Conn. 1952); Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 892 (N.J. 1988).
70 Universal Winding, 108 F. Supp. at 332.
71 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 892 (N.J. 1988).
72 Id. (citations omitted).
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However, the balancing test will reject any subject matter restriction not
absolutely necessary to protect the employer's interests:
[W]e will enforce holdover agreements to the same extent that we
will enforce similar post-employment restrictive agreements, giving
employers "that limited measure of relief within the terms of the
noncompetitive agreement which would be reasonably necessary to protect
his 'legitimate interests,' would cause 'no undue hardship' on the
employee, and would 'not impair the public interest.' "
At the same time, the balancing test must also account for whether the
employee would suffer a hardship outweighing the employer's own, most notably
upon losing the right to pursue his true research expertise: "[C]ourts must
evaluate the reasonableness of holdover agreements in light of the individual
crcumstances of the employer and employee. Courts must balance the employer's need for
protection and the hardship on the employee that may result."74
In summary, the test proposed here would vastly simplify the courts' current
trailer clause analysis, the recommended approach being reduced to a subject
matter balancing test with the time and territory prongs eliminated.
1. Relaionsho with ConfidentialInformation Covenants. It is conceded that the test
proposed here has greater affinity to the enforceability test for confidentiality
clauses than for non-competition covenants. Although the courts are far from
unanimous in this respect, many enforce confidentiality agreements by tolerating
unusually broad (or unlimited) temporal and territorial constraints. In fact, a few
judges have observed that time and territory restraints are relevant only for non-
competition agreements, and have no place in the analysis of confidential
information clauses.75 The following remarks were made by the Supreme Court
of Iowa in a case involving a trailer clause promising "not to disclose . . .
inventions," and "[to] assign... title [to inventions] ... to the Company," and
"not [to] disclose. .. confidential information":
7 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
s At the same time, there is no unanimity that confidential information restrictive covenants
should be analyzed in this manner. Some courts are so accustomed to applying non-competition
principles to any restrictive covenant that this trend has been carried over into their analysis of
confidential information clauses too. For instance, the following cases have insisted on considering
the temporal and territorial reasonableness of confidential information covenants: Nalco Chem. Co.
v. Hydro Tech. Inc., 984 F.2d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1993); State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v. Am.
Med. Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Mont. 1989); Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553
N.W.2d 513, 515 (S.D. 1996).
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Nondisclosure-confidentiality agreements enjoy more favorable
treatment in the law than do noncompete agreements. This is
because noncompete agreements are viewed as restraints of trade
which limit an employee's freedom of movement among
employment opportunities, while nondisclosure agreements seek to
restrict disclosure of information, not employment opportunities.
The distinction is based on the idea that "[o]nce a secret is
disclosed, knowledge of the information cannot normally be
confined to a particular area." Thus, imposition of geographic or
durational limitations "would defeat the entire purpose of restricting
disclosure, since confidentiality knows no temporal or geographical
boundaries." Thus, nondisclosure agreements lacking in geographic
or time limitations have been held to be enforceable.76
On the basis of this reasoning, the court concluded that "the absence of
restrictions concerning time or geographic location do not render a
nondisclosure-confidentiality agreement presumptively unenforceable. 77 Other
courts, including the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, have followed the same
reasoning, stating as follows:
The confidentiality agreement is also not invalid for want of a time
limitation. See 765 ILCS 1065/8(b)(1) ("[A] contractual or other
duty to maintain secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall not be
deemed to be void or unenforceable solely for lack of durational or
geographic limitation on the duty."). Nor is there any question that
the confidentiality agreement covers much of the information
PepsiCo fears Redmond will necessarily use in his new employment
with Quaker.78
The test proposed in Part III.B is reasonable in light of this additional
information. Arguably, invention covenants are more closely related to
confidentiality agreements than to non-competition covenants. Because this is so
(and in light of the judicial reasoning cited above), a court decidedly must not
consider time or territory constraints when reviewing the enforceability of an
inventions trailer clause.
76 Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 760-61 (Iowa 1999) (citations
omitted).
71 Id at 762.
7" PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 n.10 (7th Cit. 1995).
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This may be contrary to the impression most courts convey by basing their
enforceability tests for invention covenants on the non-competition model.7 9
However, confidential information and trade secrets are the underpinnings of
inventions. When entering into an inventions trailer, it is both the confidential
information and the actual invention which the employee is restricted from
reproducing for a subsequent employer, since the confidential information is
arguably part of the invention.
One could argue that a trailer clause serves simultaneously as an invention
assignment and as a non-disclosure restriction. That is to say, an invention
assignment provision cannot be divorced from the confidential information
underlying the invention itself. Inventing in violation of a trailer clause is more
analogous to the expropriation of confidential information than setting up a
business to compete with one's employer. This analogy supports our rationale
that the best test of trailer clause enforceability should resemble that used for
confidential information/trade secret enforceability (rather than the less relevant
non-competition test), even though this may run contrary to the practice followed
by most courts.80
Indirectly acknowledging this correlation, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has
noted that inventions (or corresponding patents) may be "based upon"
confidential information, though this question remains unresolved. The 9th
Circuit's observation arose from an employee's invention made in violation of a
confidential information restriction: "The district court concluded that the
invention disclosed in the patent was not 'based upon' Mincom's confidential
information, and therefore need not be assigned.... However, the district court
found that the inventions disclosed in the two patent applications were 'based upon' Mincom's
secrets, and ordered assignments. 
'
81
IV. CONCLUSION
It is now common practice for employers to impose catch-all clauses on their
inventing employees at the time of hire. Rarely are these agreements simple non-
competition covenants. Rather, they tend to incorporate additional clauses
governing the assignment of current and future inventions, the disclosure of
confidential information and trademarks, and a ban on solicitation of the
employer's clients. Concurrent with this trend toward comprehensive
employment agreements, the courts' analysis of trailer clauses has become
7" All cases cited in Part II.B.2 have taken this analytical approach.
0 This includes all cases discussed in Part II.B.2.
sI Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 146 (9th Cir. 1965)
(emphasis added).
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indistinguishable from its analysis of all other restrictive covenants. The courts
have not paused to question whether the non-competition test is appropriate for
invention assignment clauses. Instead, they have proceeded relentlessly to apply
the test they are most familiar with and which, on the surface, appears most
analogous.
While harmonizing employment agreements to simultaneously encompass the
elements of non-competition, non-solicitation, future inventions, current
inventions, non-disclosure of confidential information, and trade secrets, the
danger of this approach is the potential merging of analytical methodologies into
a single formula for the entire agreement, rather than a clause-specific analysis for
each type of covenant. In terms of drafting techniques, harmonizing all
provisions into one document (with the same temporal and geographic
restrictions shared by each clause) may have contributed to the one-size-fits-all
approach which courts have adopted for non-competition clauses and trailer
clauses alike.
In order to reverse this prevailing trend, this Article proposed an invention-
specific approach to gauging the enforceability of trailer clauses. This approach
rejects the application of temporal and geographic "reasonableness" to trailer
clauses, and replaces those constraints with a balancing test based on subject
matter alone. It promotes trailer clauses that are finely-tuned to the employer's
inventive subject matter. This approach also takes into account the nature and
purpose of an employee's invention assignments, rather than construing them as
a form of illicit competition. Furthermore, this approach has the potential to
balance what is at stake for both employers and employees and, most importantly,
does so in an invention-specific manner.
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